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For a Third Conflicts RestatementBut Stop Trying To Reinvent the Wheel
ALFRED HILL*
I. WHY IT IS UNNECESSARY TO REINVENT
THE LAW OF CHOICE OF LAW

I am concerned here only with those aspects of a third restatement involving choice
of law.
In all areas ofjudge-made law, with the sole exception of choice of law, the reform
of what is perceived to be bad law proceeds incrementally, by a process of erosion
and modification; and even such gradualism is fraught with large and small disasters.'
It is hard to create good law, as law teachers above all should know.
Forty-two years ago Brainerd Currie announced his discovery that the traditional
choice-of-law rules are so mired in technical arbitrariness as to be irrelevant to our
economic and social institutions and shared values-indeed, worse than irrelevant,
for to consider the traditional rules would only obscure the problem, so that the
sensible course is to refrain from examining them for even glimmerings of light,
which in any event wouldnotbefound.2 Currie's demonstration ofthis point has been
accepted as irrefutable both by those who have followed his prescriptions for interest
analysis3 and those who have not. Virtually all have agreed that choice-of-law rules,
if there are to be such rules, must be formulated anew.4
In Currie's foundation articles he devised a set of hypothetical problems in contract
and tort, and compared results reached (1) under the Restatement of the Law of
Conflict ofLaws ("FirstRestatement"); and (2) under a methodology that he believed
to implement the governmental interests of the states involved.5 But the First
Restatement was a highly conceptualistic and rigid set of rules, drafted under the
influence of a theory that eminent conflicts scholars had long thought to be
ludicrous.6 As for governmental interests, rationally pursued, Currie said that, for the

* Simon H. Rifkind Professor Emeritus of Law, Columbia Law School.
1.A general statutory solution is not practicable unless it takes the form of a codification
of the best of existing judge-made law.
2. See Brainerd Currie, MarriedWomen's Contracts:A Study in ConflictofLaws Method,
25 U. CH. L. REV. 227 (1958) [hereinafter Currie, Married Women's Contracts]; Brainerd
Currie, Survival ofActions: Adjudication Versus Automation in the Conflict ofLaws, 10 STAN.
L. REV. 205 (1958) [hereinafter Currie, Survival of Actions].
3. I firmly believe, with Currie, that choice-of-law rules should reflect governmental
interests. I also believe that, basically, this is what they have always done.
4. For a rare exception, see Robert A. Sedler, Continuity, Precedent,andChoice ofLaw:
A Reflective Response to ProfessorHill, 38 WAYNE L. REV. 1419, 1467-69 (1992). Sedler
believes that the traditional system makes sense generally, except in the case of torts. See id.
at 1439-52; cf.Earl M. Maltz, The Full Faithand CreditClause and the First Restatement:
The Place of Baker v. General Motors Corp. in Choice of Law Theory, 73 TUL. L. REV. 305,
316-29 (1998) (defending the FirstRestatement).
5. See Currie, Married Women's Contracts,supra note 2; Currie, Survival of Actions,
supra note 2.
6. See, e.g., FRIEDRICH KARL VON SAVIGNY, ATREATISEONTHE CONFLICTOF LAws 147

(W.Guthrie trans., 2d ed. 1880) (The vested rights theory "leads into a complete circle; for we
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purpose of simplification, the interests postulated in his foundation articles were those
that would be pursued by "a quite selfish state ... blind to consequences, and
interested only in short-run gains."' 7 "No such state exists," he said, "at least in this
[C]ountry." 8 Thus Currie compared results under a distorted version of the traditional
methodology with results under a concededly flawed system of his own devising.
This proved nothing about the operation of the traditional rules.
The flaw in Currie's methodology was omission of a governmental interest of
special pertinence in choice of law. A "selfish" state that, "blind to consequences,"
pursues only "short-run gains," would be a state that misconceives its own interests.
That there is no such state may manifest a universal sense that the forum's selfinterest requires a measure of accommodation to the interests of other concerned
states. Currie was aware of the desirability of accommodation, but he
assumed-arbitrarily, it seems to this writer-that accommodation is exclusively
within the province of the legislature.9 Thus Currie's system consigned the courts to
a practice that actually defeated the interests of the forum; the courts were to make
bad law while waiting for the legislature to make good law. His way out of this
dilemma emerged in later writing. The forum, he stated repeatedly, should use
"moderation and restraint" in determining the out-of-state reach of local policies, with
a view to mitigating clashes with other states."0 This of course was accommodation
by another name. And those' who are now prescribing rules to resolve real conflicts
are usually working for accommodation, whether or not they use that term.
Does the traditional methodology really neglect long-term governmental interests?
Currie did not see how it could be otherwise. Apart from his criticism of the specifics
of the First Restatement, he believed that traditional choice-of-law rules were
essentially the product of "metaphysical" speculations "concerning the nature of law
and its abstract operation in space."' He even suggested that these speculations were
grounded in "superstition and sorcery." 2 Writing after the appearance of Currie's
earliest articles, I expressed incredulity that a body of law that has engaged so many
minds for so many centuries should be thought totally irrelevant to the needs of the

can only know what are vested rights, if we know beforehand by what local law we are to
decide as to their acquisition.").
7. Currie, Married Women's Contracts, supra note 2, at 237 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
8. Brainerd Currie, The Verdict of Quiescent Years: Mr. Hilland the Conflict ofLaws, 28
U. CHi. L. REV. 258, 286 (1961).
9. In his view, an accommodationist policy would require "subordination" ofthe interests
of the forum to those of another jurisdiction. He stated that this was an inappropriate role for
a court, without saying why. See Currie, Married Women's Contracts,supra note 2, at 250.
What his system really entailed was subordination of the long-term interests of the forum, for
no understandable reason.
10. Brainerd Currie, The Silver OarandAll That: A Study of the Romero Case, 27 U.CHI.
L. REV. 1, 69 (1959); see also Brainerd Currie, Notes on Methods and Objectives in the
Conflict ofLaws, 1959 DUKE L.J. 171, 179-80 [hereinafter Currie, Notes on Methods]; Currie,
supra note 8, at 285-87.
11. Currie, Notes on Methods, supra note 10, at 173-74.
12. Brainerd Currie, Justice Traynor andthe Conflict ofLaws, 13 STAN. L. REV. 719, 778
(1961).
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societies in which this body of law emerged. I put this view in conclusory terms,
since it seemed obvious to the point of banality. 3 Currie replied with an expression
of skepticism, and let it go at that.' 4 Twenty-five years later I wrote an article entitled
The JudicialFunction in ChoiceofLaw, 5 in which I attempted to show that, good or
bad, these rules were not arbitrary constructs blind to governmental interests. This
article has gone unchallenged.
The problem today is that, in consequence ofCurrie's "proof," the dogmatics ofthe
FirstRestatement are confused with the corpus oftraditional choice-of-law rules. The
First Restatement was an attempt to rationalize the entire field on the basis of the
theory of vested rights. But living law is not the product of a theory. Theories, often
conflicting with one another, are advanced to make sense of the living law, which,
largely because it reflects the social condition, is complex and unruly. It is true that
theories often tend to generate their own rules, but this leads to sterility when the
logic of the theory prevails over promotion of the public good-the First Conflicts
Restatement being an example. The value of a particular rule should be determined
by the desirability of the outcomes it produces.
Take, for example, lex loci delicti. This rule has long been dominant throughout the
world. 6 To say that this should count for nothing is to make a breathtaking assertion
about the lack of good sense ofjurists in most times and places other than the United
States today. Surely such a rule does not owe its purchase to abstract speculation
about the nature of law in space. Consider that the effect of this rule is that the alleged
tortfeasor is held to the behavioral standards of the place where he or she acted or
where the conduct foreseeably took effect; and that the victim's rights are governed
by the law of the same place, just as the burden of that law would be imposed upon
the victim for his or her tortious conduct there. Whether tortfeasor or victim, the
foreigner is not discriminated against qua foreigner. The accommodationist nature of
the rule should be apparent. I think that, at bottom, the objections to lex loci delicti
are not that it produces these effects, but rather that it produces other, less desirable,
effects, by application to a wide range of collateral issues. This need not be so. It is
an illusion to suppose that lex loci delicti must be swallowed whole or not at all.
It is submitted that for the most part the traditional rules lend themselves to analysis
along similar lines. Current opinion may vary about the desirability of these rules in
operation, but this calls for modification of the rules accordingly rather than
wholesale rejection. 7

13. See Alfred Hill, GovernmentalInterestandthe Conflict ofLaws-A Reply to Professor
Currie, 27 U. CHI. L. REV. 463, 502-04 (1960).
14. See Currie, supra note 8, at 181.
15. Alfred Hill, The JudicialFunctionin Choice ofLaw, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1585 (1985).
16. See ERNST RABEL, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 235 (2d ed.

1960).
17. Traditional choice of law has been attacked as comprised of so-called jurisdictionselecting rules, calling for application of the law of a particularjurisdiction without regard to
whether that law has a rationally defensible bearing on the issues in controversy. Those who
are framing choice-of-law rules in the modem era are confident that their own rules are not
deficient on this score. They believe that a rule like lex loci delicti is obviously deficient
because, strictly applied, it produces what are now thought to be some bad results. But, despite
their best efforts, their own rules may also be subject to such criticism; it is notorious that the
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II. BUILDING ON THE SECOND RESTATEMENT

Again, my concern here is only with choice of law.
Basically, the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws ("Second Restatement")
consists of two parts: (1) an apparatus; and (2) specific rules. 8 The latter, which
comprise by far the greater part of the Second Restatement, commonly bear a close
resemblance to the pre-Currie rules, and are usually supported by abundant precedent.
It is these specific rules, modified as thought desirable, that can serve as building
blocks for the third restatement. They already conform in large measure to the issueby-issue approach, which is the great positive achievement ofthe conflicts revolution.
The apparatus of the Second Restatement consists basically of prescription of the
law of the place of the most significant relationship as an overarching principle.
Various check lists are provided for aid in determining the place to be chosen. Of
these, the most important is that provided in section 6, which itemizes what are
described as the basic objectives of choice of law. 9 The Second Restatement took the
final form it did because its framers became increasingly receptive to the new
learning. They believed in rules (as distinct from Currie's ad hoc methodology), but
they were apparently persuaded that a deliberate admixture of interest analysis would
be useful in the development of desirable rules.
These hopes have not been realized. Scholars have derided the SecondRestatement,
without arriving at any consensus of what the law ought to be, or whether there ought
to be any law. The courts on the other hand have largely purported to follow the
Second Restatement. But except when some of the Restatement's specific rules have
been applied, the result of their labor has been chaos. A common solution has been
application of the law of the forum, which (almost) everybody agrees is the negation
of any law of choice of law. What is particularly striking about the usual judicial
reasoning in these cases is its sheer shallowness. This is not the fault of the judges,
who are even less suited to reinvention of the law than scholars, lacking the
abundance of time available to the latter. The task would probably be too much even
for the Hercules of Ronald Dworkin's fancy. Besides, his forte is to reason from the
law-not invent it from scratch. I think it would be well to jettison the apparatus of
the Second Restatement altogether, including section 6. Even if a checklist
methodology has any value (in my view, none), I think that value is substantially
outweighed by a tendency to promote indiscriminate counting as a substitute for
thought, especially on the judicial level.
Finally, we must consider that restatements, like statutory codes, are typically
closed-ended; they do not have escape clauses. This has less potential for harm in a
restatement, since it is never binding on a court. Nevertheless escape clauses would
be useful in one devoted to choice of law because of the unsettled state of the field,

proponents of these rules disagree with each other. It is time to recognize that thejurisdictionselecting label is not a useful one. The traditional rules, like those now being developed, are
devoted, however articulated, to advancement of governmental interest. The question, pertinent
to the old and new rules alike, is how effectively they do so, and how much needs to be done
to make them do it better.
18. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (1971).

19. See id. § 6.
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and also because this would be conducive to consensus among those whose support
for a third restatement would be important. The difficult question is how such clauses
should be worded. I have a tentative solution, to wit: "unless the court is satisfied that
the law of some other place would produce a more just outcome, considering the
nature of the issue to be decided." I would leave this to the common sense of the
judges, and not burden them with checklists or other guides.

